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Abstract
Since the early 80s, orphan drug regulations have been introduced to stimulate R&D for
rare diseases. We develop a theoretical model to study the heterogeneous impact on opti-
mal R&D decisions of the incentives for diseases with different levels of prevalence. We
show the mechanisms through which the type of incentives deployed by orphan drug regu-
lations may stimulate R&D more for orphan diseases with comparatively high prevalence,
thus increasing inequality within the class of orphan diseases. Using data from the Food and
Drug Administration on the number of orphan designations, our empirical analysis shows
that, while R&D has increased over time for all orphan diseases, the increase has been much
greater for the less rare. According to our baseline specification, the difference between
the predicted number of orphan designations for a disease belonging to the highest and the
lowest class of prevalence is 5.6 times larger after 2008 than it was in 1983. Our findings
support the idea that the type of incentives in place may be responsible for this increase in
inequality within orphan diseases.
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1 Introduction
Orphan diseases are those that affect a small number of individuals, with the exact definition
varying from one institutional context to another. Despite the fact that each of these diseases often
affects only few people, there are currently 7,000 orphan diseases described in the literature, so
that it is estimated that 25 to 30 million US citizens and 27 to 36 million EU residents suffer from
an orphan disease (Health and Safety, 2015). However, less than 10% of rare diseases currently
known have an available treatment (Melnikova, 2012; Tambuyzer, 2010).
Given that the pharmaceutical industry is mainly responsible for R&D investments for new
drugs, the allocation of resources across diseases is affected by the expected return on invest-
ments. Hence, the market size is a critical dimension. The empirical and theoretical analysis
of the effect of market size on innovation identifies a positive relationship. Acemoglu and Linn
(2004) find that a 1% increase in potential market size is associated with a 6% increase in the total
number of new drugs launched in the US market and with a 4% increase when only nongeneric
drugs are taken into account. The result is confirmed by Dubois et al. (2015), who find that R&D
efforts are directed towards larger markets, and estimate that, on average, additional revenues of
$2.5 billion are required to support the invention of one new chemical entity. Jobjörnsson et al.
(2016) propose a theoretical model to study how the interaction between the regulation of mar-
keting approval by institutions such as FDA and EMA and reimbursement decisions by pay-
ers affects R&D investment, showing that R&D investments are less likely if a disease is rare.
Barrenho et al. (2019) use data on marketing authorizations to obtain concentration curves and
concentration indexes of innovation, according to the burden of disease and the market size. They
find that innovation is concentrated toward diseases with a greater market size, i.e. those with
higher prevalence or higher willingness to pay.
In addition to the limited size of the market, research efforts directed towards orphan diseases
may be hindered by the difficulty in identifying patients with rare diseases for clinical trials, in
the logistic organization of the trials themselves, by the poor understanding of the course of the
disease, as well as by the low expertise in the medical community (Tambuyzer, 2010).
In order to address the lack of incentives to undertake research targeting rare pathologies,
policy makers have introduced a number of tools to incentivize R&D for orphan diseases. The
main tools are tax credits on R&D expenditure, market exclusivity for new products, protocol
assistance and reduced marketing authorization fees. The necessary formal step to access these
incentives is obtaining an orphan drug designation (ODD) from the competent regulatory author-
ity. The first special legislation was introduced in the United States, with the Orphan Drug Act
(ODA), approved in 1983. Since then, several other countries have established regulations for
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the development of orphan drugs. The economic rationale for these incentives can be hardly re-
lated to efficiency: given that R&D costs are largely independent of the market size, other things
being equal, the expected return per unit of investment in terms of population health is lower
when the size of the market is smaller. On the other hand, inequality aversion provides a strong
motivation, given the huge differences in the availability of treatments between rare and common
diseases. The problem can also fit an equality of opportunity framework (Raïs Ali and Tubeuf,
2019), given that the disease prevalence is clearly beyond individual control (Roemer, 1998).
Overall, there seems to be a general consensus that special regulations adopted over the
world have contributed to closing the gap between orphan and non-orphan diseases. Braun et al.
(2010), Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2009) and Yin (2008) show evidence of a positive impact
of the ODA on R&D directed to orphan diseases and Lichtenberg (2013) finds that an increased
availability of drugs for orphan diseases reduced mortality. A positive impact on the number of
designations and approvals for orphan drugs is also found in Europe (Westermark et al., 2011).
On the other hand, concerns have been raised that part of the increase in the number of designa-
tions and approvals might not be the result of a really innovative effort, but rather due to strategic
behaviour by the pharmaceutical industry. For example, Yin (2009) highlights that firms have in-
centives to develop drugs for rare subdivisions of more common diseases, pointing that as much
as 10% of innovations for orphan diseases would have been developed even in absence of the
policy. It is therefore important that incentive policies are efficiently designed, so to maximize
the social return on expenditure.
While most of the literature has addressed the question whether special regulations are ef-
fective in reducing the gap between R&D for orphan and non orphan diseases, far less atten-
tion has been devoted to the possibly heterogeneous impact across different orphan diseases.
However, this is an extremely relevant issue, given the huge number of orphan diseases and the
large variability among them, along several dimensions. Among previous studies on this topic,
Heemstra et al. (2009) take into account orphan designations in Europe and the US, and highlight
a strong heterogeneity in the level of research effort across different diseases, the heterogeneity
depending on the therapeutic class, prevalence and the number of scientific publications. Yin
(2008) analyzes the impact of the ODA on R&D activity targeting rare diseases, proxied by the
number of clinical trials, and shows that the rarest diseases have benefited less from the intro-
duction of the special legislation in the United States.
The dimension of heterogeneity, on which this paper focuses, is prevalence. Among orphan
diseases, there are some that affect almost 100,000 individuals worldwide and others that only
record few cases. We believe that, if an equity argument provides the rationale for incentivizing
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orphan versus non-orphan diseases, the equity implications of these incentives within the class of
orphan diseases cannot be disregarded. Our analysis aims at characterizing the dynamic impact
of orphan regulations introduced over time and across countries.
We use a simple theoretical model to study the impact of orphan regulation on two outcomes:
i) the probability of having any investment in R&D for a certain disease ii) the intensity of the
R&D effort, which affects the probability of obtaining an ODD. To account for the heterogeneity
in the tool set used in different contexts, we separately consider output-related incentives (e.g.,
market exclusivity) and input-related incentives (e.g., tax credits). We show that both types
of incentives have an unambiguously stronger effect on the first outcome for less rare diseases,
meaning that the impact on the probability of having any investment is larger for less rare diseases
among the orphan ones. This advantage of less rare diseases is greater when output-related
incentives are in place. This means that the exposure to treatment (incentives) changes with
the prevalence of the disease. In terms of investment intensity, it is not possible to conclude
unambiguously whether more or less rare diseases benefit more from the incentives.
The empirical counterpart of our theoretical model is a Zero Inflated count data model, where
the dependent variable is the yearly number of ODD at the disease level, as a proxy for R&D
intensity. For the sake of consistency with the distributional assumptions that we make, the
excess of zeros is modelled using the Gumbel distribution, to replace the standard Logit or Probit
model. We adopt a difference-in-differences approach to exploit the fact that reforms have been
introduced at different points in time in different geographic areas and that, according to our
theoretical results, diseases with different prevalence might have benefited differently from the
regulations.
We find that, over time, R&D efforts have increased substantially more for less rare diseases
within the class of orphan diseases, thus increasing inequality within the class of orphan diseases.
These conclusions remain valid even when controlling for a number of other factors potentially
affecting the relative convenience of investing in less vis-a-vis more rare diseases. To the best
of our knowledge, no evidence of this dynamics has been previously reported. Based on our
theoretical results, we argue that the way in which orphan incentives were designed may have
contributed to widening this gap. By relying almost exclusively on output-related incentives, the
European legislation may have exacerbated this tendency.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that, if inequality aversion is a fundamen-
tal motivation for orphan legislation, then a revision of the incentive tool-kit should be consid-
ered, with the objective of curbing the widening of the gap between less and more rare orphan
diseases. One way of mitigating this tendency could be to shift the balance of incentives towards
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input-related tools. A more radical reform could consider abandoning the idea of setting an arbi-
trary threshold of prevalence, below which all diseases benefit from the same type of incentives,
to move towards prevalence-dependent incentives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the different regulations that have
been adopted over time. Section 3 describes the model, which is solved in Section 4. Section 5
ans 6 describe, respectively, data and methodology for the empirical analysis, whose results are
presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes and discusses the policy implications.
2 Institutional context
Over the last 35 years, orphan drug regulations have been adopted in several countries around the
world (Pammolli et al., 2009). The US were the first country to develop a specific legislation. In
1983 the Congress signed the ODA, according to which a drug is considered orphan if it treats
a rare disease or condition affecting fewer than 200,000 persons in the US (about 6.25 in 10
thousand persons) or if it is not expected to be profitable within seven years following approval
by the FDA.1 The incentives for drugs designated as orphan are (1) assistance from the Office
of Orphan Product Development during the development process; (2) tax credits (up to 50% of
clinical development costs); (3) exemption or waiver of application (filing) fees; (4) seven years
of marketing exclusivity2 and (5) subsidies for clinical trials from the Orphan Products Grant
Program.
Special regulations with the same objectives have subsequently been introduced in several
countries, such as Singapore (1991), Japan (1993), Australia (1998), South Korea (1998), the
1This is the current definition of orphan drugs, that was introduced with the Health Promotion and Disease
Prevention Amendments of 1984. Indeed, originally the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 defined a rare disease as one that
"occurs so infrequently in the United States that there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and
making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from the sales in the
United States of such drug". Other minor amendments of the ODA took place over the years to mitigate strategic
behavior on the side of the firm (Herder, 2017).
2Market exclusivity represents a stronger protection for firms compared to patents. While patents prevent other
companies from making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing for these purposes the drug, market ex-
clusivity implies that the regulatory agency cannot approve another drug for the same indication without the spon-
sor’s consent. Moreover, patent protection is filed early in the development process, whereas market exclusivity is
granted when the product is launched in the market. As the development process can last many years (DiMasi et al.,
2016), empirical analysis has shown that market exclusivity, on average, extends patent protection by 0.8 years
(Seoane-Vazquez et al., 2008). Furthermore, some orphan drugs contain natural products for which it is not possible
to obtain patent protection (Pammolli et al., 2009). For these reasons, we believe the fact that several countries
introduced or extended their patent coverage for pharmaceuticals during the analyzed period is not relevant for our
analysis.
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EU (2000) and Taiwan (2000).3 In what follows we only consider the introduction of special
regulations in the three areas with the largest markets: US, Japan and the EU.
In April 1993, Japan substantially revised its orphan medicinal product system, introduced in
1985, so as to extend the tools used to incentivize research on orphan diseases. So, in addition to
the already existing (1) reductions in the required data for application, and (2) accelerated review
process, the following incentives were introduced: (3) protocol assistance; (4) tax credits (up to
6% of clinical and non-clinical costs); (5) subsidies for clinical and nonclinical studies and (6)
ten years of market exclusivity. Compared to those introduced in the US, incentives introduced
in Japan entail a longer period of market exclusivity, but a lower percentage for the computation
of the tax credit.4 In order to be designated as orphan, the drug, which has to be proved highly
effective and safe, has to treat a rare and serious disease or condition affecting less than 50,000
persons in Japan (about 4 in 10 thousand persons), and such disease should not have any other
available treatment. Since in Japan the incentive tools which are the main focus of our analysis
were introduced in 1993, we refer to this as the date when the special legislation was introduced.
In December 1999, also the European Union approved a regulation on orphan medicinal
products: the Regulation (EC) No 141/2000.5 The regulation establishes a procedure for desig-
nating orphan drugs and sets incentives for R&D. The incentives include (1) protocol assistance;
(2) access to a centralized procedure allowing immediate marketing authorization in all member
states; (3) reduced fees for regulatory procedures and (4) ten years of market exclusivity. In order
to benefit from the incentives, orphan drugs have to be designated as such before the marketing
authorization is granted. Moreover, the targeted drug has to treat a condition affecting no more
than 5 in 10 thousand persons in the Community when the application is made, or it has to treat a
life threatening or chronically debilitating condition for which it is unlikely, without incentives,
that the marketing of the medicinal product in the Community would generate sufficient return to
justify the necessary investment;6 finally, there should exist no satisfactory alternative methods
authorized in the Community or the medicinal product has to bring significant benefit to those
affected by that condition (article 3 of the Regulation). In addition to the incentives mentioned
in the regulation, some member states have introduced other measures to support R&D, such as
tax reductions (allowed in France and the Netherlands) (Health and Safety, 2015).
3With the exception of Australia, all these countries provide (extra) market exclusivity for orphan drugs
(Sharma et al., 2010).
4Indeed, non-clinical costs per approved new compound are estimated to be lower than clinical costs (1 billion
US$ versus 1.5 billion US$, according to DiMasi et al. 2016).
5As in the US, also in Europe several regulations took place after the first one. Also in this case, however, none
of the following six regulations modified the incentives introduced with the first one and presented here.
6According to Tambuyzer (2010), more than 99.5% of orphan designations in Europe are granted because of the
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US (1983) Japan (1993) Europe (2000)
Disease:
Prevalence < 200,000 in US < 50,000 in Japan < 5 in 10,000
(6.25/10,000) (4/10,000)
Characteristics Rare or Rare Rare or
not profitable not profitable & life-threatening
Serious
No other treatment No other treatment
available or available or
clinically superior clinically superior
Main incentives:
Tax credit Yes Yes Member state
(50% clinical costs) (6% clinical and specific
non-clinical costs)
Market exclusivity Yes (7 years) Yes (10 years) Yes (10 years)
Reduced applic. fees Yes (waved) No Yes (reduced)
Protocol assist. Yes Yes Yes
Subsidies for clinical trials Yes Yes No
Table 1: Comparison of orphan drugs regulations in the US, Japan and EU.
Incentives provided by the US, Japan and Europe are summarized in Table 1, together with
requirements for drugs to be considered as orphan.
Since November 2007, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the FDA are collabo-
rating to encourage joint applications to the orphan drug status both in Europe and the US. A
common application form has been developed, in an effort to reduce the administrative burden
on the orphan drug sponsor (Braun et al., 2010; Mariz et al., 2016). Parallel applications in Japan
and Europe are also encouraged, although a common application form is not in place yet, due to
administrative differences between the two offices (Mariz et al., 2016).
prevalence criteria.
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3 The model
Let N f firms be free to decide on the size of an R&D investment, I ≥ 0, targeting disease
j, which affects nj individuals. For an orphan drug, there are two key regulatory steps in the
development process. In the first step, the firm that has developed a molecular entity applies for
an ODD. If granted, the ODD makes the firm eligible for any incentive related to the development
of an orphan drug. If the development process is successfully completed, the firm will approach
the second regulatory stage: marketing authorization. From the perspective of the firm, both
stages entail uncertainty. Let pdj (I) be the probability that the firm obtains an ODD, given the
R&D investment I . For the function pdj (I) we introduce the standard assumptions
∂pd
j
∂I
> 0 and
∂2pd
j
∂I2
< 0. Moreover, given that pdj is a probability, pdj (0) = 0 and limI→∞ pdj (I) = 1.
Conditional on obtaining an ODD, the firm will carry on the development process. With
probability pmj this will lead to the marketing approval of the product.7 Given the disease specific
per patient net revenue mj , conditional on obtaining an ODD, the expected net revenue is pmj ·
mj . To simplify notation, we define the individual level expected net revenue, conditional on
having obtained an ODD, as Mj(Ωj) = pmj mj . The parameter Ωj is a vector of disease specific
characteristics that may affect the probability pmj and / or the net revenue mj . For example, some
regulators grant a price premium to drugs targeting life threatening conditions.
The expected profit for firm i (1, 2, . . . , N f ) associated with an investment I targeting disease
j is:
EΠij = p
d
j (I)[Mj · nj]− I + δij. (1)
The term δij is an idiosyncratic component aiming to capture any additional component of the
expected profit that is only known to the firm. This may result, for example, from the possibility
of exploiting knowledge acquired on other projects that the firm had previously undertaken.
From the perspective of the researcher, δij is the realization of a random variable, with density
f(∆). According to Eq. 1, a new drug that obtains market authorization takes the whole market.
We believe that this simplifying assumption is reasonable. Indeed, market exclusivity, which
is part of the set of incentives deployed for all regulations described in Section 2, prevents the
authorization of a new drug unless it is shown to be more effective than the current standard of
treatment. This suggests that, if a new drug is authorized while market exclusivity still holds, the
new drug is likely to take the whole market.
The aim of our analysis is to study the impact of different forms of incentives among those
that have been introduced as part of the special legislation on: i) the probability of having in-
7Without loss of generality, pmj is assumed independent of I .
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vestment on a rare disease, ii) the probability of having an orphan designation. Our analysis is
carried out within the class of orphan diseases. In other words, we do not contrast rare versus
non-rare disease, but more versus less rare diseases within the class of orphan diseases. As a
result, we assume that all diseases are eligible for incentives. Our focus is on how the impact of
different types of incentives is affected by the prevalence of an orphan disease.
Incentives can be distinguished into two categories: output-related and input-related. Output-
related incentives are those that aim to increase the net market revenue of investments made on
orphan diseases. The best known instance of such instrument is market exclusivity, to which all
products with an orphan designation are entitled. This is part of the incentive package provided,
for example, by the US, Japan and Europe. We model this as a mark-up, z (z ≥ 0), on net
revenues. This way of modeling output-related incentives is sufficiently flexible to account also
for other types of incentives, such as a price premium to which all orphan drugs are equally
entitled.
Input-related incentives reduce the cost of R&D investment for rare diseases. Examples
of such incentives include tax credits, reduced fees for market authorization applications and
protocol assistance. We model this type of incentive as an allowance on investment costs, such
that the investment cost borne by the firm is I(1− γ), with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. To take the role of these
incentives into account, the expected profit function can be written as:
EΠij = p
d
j (I)[Mj · nj](1 + z)− (1− γ)I + δij. (2)
4 Optimal investment policy
In this section, we study the firms’ optimal investment policy and the impact of R&D incentives
on the expected number of ODD, our proxy for R&D effort. The focus is on how this impact
is affected by the size of the market (disease prevalence). Given that innovations are protected
by market exclusivity and that only for a small fraction of orphan diseases (6%) more than one
treatment is authorized, we believe that it is reasonable to introduce the simplifying assumption
that firms make their investment decisions independently.
We start by characterizing the decision from the perspective of a single firm and then move
to the analysis of the outcome of these decisions at the market (disease) level.
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4.1 The firm’s decisions
The firm aims to maximize the expected profit in Eq. 2 with respect to I . The first order condition
is:
∂pdj (I)
∂I
=
1− γ
Mj · nj(1 + z)
. (3)
The second order conditions are satisfied under the assumptions on the functional form
of pdj (I) that were introduced above. Eq. 3 implicitly defines the optimal investment level
I∗(Mj, nj) and highlights the well known role of market size as an incentive for R&D invest-
ments: with nj small, other things being equal, the optimal investment level is lower.
4.1.1 Impact of output-related incentives
We can use the implicit function theorem to study the impact of an increase in z on the optimal
level of investment:
dI∗
dz
= −
1− γ
(∂2pdj/∂I
2)Mjnj(1 + z)2
. (4)
According to Eq. 4, an increase in z provides an incentive to invest more, by reducing the value
on the right hand side of Eq. 3. From the perspective of our analysis, it is also interesting to
investigate how the marginal impact on I∗ of an increase in z varies with nj . Differentiating the
right hand side of Eq. 4 with respect to nj obtains:
∂2I∗
∂z∂nj
=
(∂pdj/∂I)(∂
3pdj/∂I
3)− (∂2pdj/∂I
2)2
(∂2pdj/∂I
2)2(1 + z)2
(1 + z)
∂I∗
∂nj
. (5)
Given that ∂I∗/∂nj > 0 (see Eq. 3), the sign of Eq. 5 is the same as the sign of its first term.
Since ∂3pdj/∂I3 may be positive,8 the expression cannot be unambiguously signed. This means
that, conditional on I∗ > 0, we cannot unambiguously say whether the impact on the probability
of obtaining a designation of strengthening an output-related incentive is greater for a more or a
less rare disease.
Given I∗(Mj, nj), the firm will only invest if the expected profit at the time of investment is
non-negative, i.e.:
pdj (I
∗(Mj, nj, z, γ))[Mj · nj](1 + z)− (1− γ)I
∗(Mj, nj, z, γ) + δij ≥ 0. (6)
It is then possible to define a minimum value of δij , δˆj , such that the firm makes any investment
8Indeed, the sign is positive for the increasing and concave functional forms typically employed in economics.
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in R&D for disease j:
δˆj = (1− γ)I
∗(Mj, nj, z, γ)− p
d
j (I
∗(Mj, nj, z, γ))[Mj · nj](1 + z). (7)
To investigate the impact of nj on the decision whether to invest or not, we study the depen-
dency of δˆj on nj . Observing that
δˆj = −EΠij(I
∗) + δij, (8)
which allows to simplify calculations through the application of the Envelope Theorem, the
following expression obtains:
∂δˆj
∂nj
= −pdj (I
∗(Mj, nj, z, γ))Mj(1 + z) < 0. (9)
Hence, other things being equal, for a comparatively rare disease the value of δij must be larger
for the firm to decide to undertake any investment (Eq. 9). Thus, it is less likely to observe R&D
investment in comparatively rare diseases.
Using a similar approach, we can study the impact of an increase in z on the value of the
stochastic variable above which a positive amount is invested. This leads to
∂δˆj
∂z
= −pdj (I
∗(Mj, nj, z, γ)) ·Mj · nj < 0, (10)
which shows the role of z in making it more likely that there is investment for disease j, by
reducing the value of δˆj . Also in this case, we are interested in the heterogeneous impact of this
incentive tool across different classes of prevalence. By differentiating the right hand side of Eq.
10 with respect to nj , we obtain:
∂2δˆj
∂z∂nj
= −Mj
[
∂pdj
∂I
∂I∗
∂nj
nj + p
d
j (I
∗)
]
< 0. (11)
The negative sign of the expression means that the impact on the probability that the firm under-
takes any investment of an increase in z is larger for less rare diseases.
11
4.1.2 Impact of input-related incentives
As for z, the impact on I∗ of an increase in γ is positive (see Eq. 3). Concerning the heterogeneity
of the impact, using the same approach as above, we find that:
∂2I∗
∂γ∂nj
=
(∂3pdj/∂I
3)(∂I∗/∂nj)nj + ∂
2pdj/∂I
2
(∂2pdj/∂I
2)2Mj · n2j(1 + z)
. (12)
As for z, this term cannot be unambiguously signed, meaning that the impact of an increase
in γ on I∗, and hence on the probability of having an ODD, conditional on investing, may be
increasing or decreasing in the disease prevalence.
Concerning the impact on the minimum value of the idiosyncratic term that makes an invest-
ment in disease j profitable, we have that,
∂δˆj
∂γ
= −I∗(Mj, nj, z, γ) < 0 (13)
and
∂2δˆj
∂γ∂nj
= −
∂I∗
∂nj
< 0. (14)
Also in this case, the impact is greater for less rare diseases.
The following proposition states an important difference between an input-related and an
output-related incentive:
Proposition 1. For both types of incentives, the reduction in δˆj is greater for less rare diseases.
However, while for an input-related incentive this is due only to an indirect effect, for an output-
related incentive there is both a direct and an indirect effect.
The proposition follows immediately from the comparison between Eq. 11 and Eq. 14.
In terms of magnitude, a marginal increase in z can be interpreted as an increase by, e.g. 1%
in expected revenues from commercialization. Similarly, for γ, it can be seen as a 1% reduction
in the investment cost faced by the firm. As long as expected revenues and investment costs are
sufficiently similar, the magnitudes of the two impacts can be compared by comparing ∂
2δˆj
∂z∂nj
with
∂2δˆj
∂γ∂n
. This comparison shows that, starting from a situation with no incentive (z = 0, γ = 0),
the introduction of an output-related incentive provides a greater comparative advantage for less
rare disease, than the introduction of an input-related incentive.9
9To see this, substitute into Eq. 11, the expression for Mj · nj from Eq. 3 and compare the resulting expression
with Eq. 14.
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4.2 Market outcomes
We can now move to the study of the impact of incentives at the disease level, under the assump-
tion that the N f firms make independent investment decisions, as characterized in the previous
subsection. We will focus on two outcomes:
1. the probability that at least one firm makes an R&D investment targeting disease j;
2. the expected number of ODD for disease j.
Starting with the first outcome of interest, investment by at least one firm occurs if
max
i
{δij} > δˆj. (15)
For the most common types of distributions f(∆), including the normal and the exponential,
the Gumbel distribution is the limiting distribution of maxi{δij} (Ahsanullah, 2016). We denote
by fG(δ˜) and FG(δ˜), respectively, the probability density function and the cumulative density
function of maxi{δij}. The indicator function IIj can be used to define whether at least one firm
invests in disease j (IIj = 1) or not (IIj = 0). The probability that at least on firm invests in j is
P(IIj = 1) = 1−
∫ δˆj
−∞
fG(δ˜)dδ˜. (16)
Following the analysis of the previous subsection, our focus is on how the impact of incentives
changes with prevalence, i.e.
∂2P(IIj = 1)
∂z∂nj
= −

∂2FG(δ˜)
∂δ˜2
∂δˆj
∂n
∂δˆj
∂z
+
∂FG(δ˜)
∂δ˜
∂2δˆj
∂z∂n

 (17)
and
∂2P(IIj = 1)
∂γ∂nj
= −

∂2FG(δ˜)
∂δ˜2
∂δˆj
∂n
∂δˆj
∂γ
+
∂FG(δ˜)
∂δ˜
∂2δˆj
∂γ∂n

 . (18)
According to the analysis presented in Section 4.1, the sign of the second term in brackets is
negative for both expressions. Since the derivatives of δˆj with respect to n, z and γ are also
negative, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. ∂
2FG(δ˜)
∂δ˜2
≤ 0 is a sufficient condition for both an output-related and an input-
related incentive to increase the probability of observing investment in disease j more for less
rare diseases.
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According to Eq. 17 and 18 the condition is not necessary, because if it is not satisfied, the
two terms in brackets have opposite signs. However, for our market of interest, we argue that
the condition is very likely to be satisfied. One may think, for example, of a situation where the
distribution of ∆ is symmetric. In this case, the condition of Proposition 2 requires that investing
in disease j is optimal for less than half of the firms. Given the scarcity of investment in R&D
for rare diseases, this is very likely to be satisfied.
We can now move to the study of the impact of incentives on the expected number of ODD,
conditional on IIj = 1. Let N˜ f (δˆj) be the number of firms that decide to invest in j, because
δij > δˆj . For each of these firms, the investment decision has a Bernoulli outcome, with prob-
ability of obtaining an ODD equal to pdj (I∗j ). From Eq. 3, the optimal investment level, and
hence the probability of success, is the same for all firms for which it is convenient to invest
in disease j. The sum of N˜ f (δˆj) independent random variables with Bernoulli distribution has
a Binomial(N˜ f (δˆj), pdj (I∗j )) distribution, whose limiting distribution is Poisson. If we take this
approximation, the number of ODD, conditional on investment is distributed Poisson, with pa-
rameter λj = N˜ f (δˆj) · pdj (I
∗
j ).
10
The following proposition summarizes the results of the theoretical analysis of the impact of
incentives on the expected number of ODD across different classes of prevalence.
Proposition 3. Conditional on at least one firm investing in disease j, the impact of incentives
on the expected number of orphan designations may be greater or lower for less rare diseases.
The ambiguity of this impact follows from the fact that the expected number of designations is
λj = N˜
f (δˆj)·p
d
j (I
∗
j ). The impact on the probability of having at least one firm investing in market
j has been shown to be greater for less rare diseases. However, this does not necessarily imply
that the impact on N˜ f (δˆj) is also greater, as this depends on the distribution of δij . Moreover, the
impact on I∗j is also ambiguous (Eq. 5 and Eq. 12). This prevents us from signing the impact on
λj theoretically.
Table 2 summarizes our theoretical results, separately for the two outcomes that have been
considered: the probability that at least one firm invests and the expected number of ODD,
conditional on investment. For consistency with the empirical analysis that follows, the table
refers to P(IIj = 0). Our main focus is on the lower part of the table, i.e. on how the impact on
the two outcomes of interest changes with prevalence. The previous analysis has shown that both
input-related and output-related incentives tend to favor less rare diseases in terms of probability
10Given that λj is disease specific, in the empirical analysis, where several diseases are considered, we refer to
the Negative Binomial distribution, to account for over-dispersion.
14
Pr(IIj = 0) # ODD (IIj = 1)
δˆj λj = N˜
f (δˆj) · p
d
j (I
∗)
↑ nj Negative Positive
↑ z Negative Positive
↑ γ Negative Positive
prevalence and exposure to treatment
↑ z Larger for larger nj Ambiguous
↑ γ Larger for larger nj Ambiguous
Table 2: Summary of theoretical results
that at least one firm invests. For the impact on the expected number of ODD, conditional on
having investment, the impact is ambiguous.
5 Data and measures
The first step in our analysis is the identification of the full list of orphan diseases, i.e. those for
which a drug is eligible to obtain an ODD. For this purpose, we rely on the Orphanet database
(INSERM, 1999), which is the standard reference for information on rare diseases.11 The list of
rare diseases is systematically updated, as approximately 250 new diseases are described each
year (Westermark et al., 2011; Wästfelt et al., 2006). The version used in the empirical analysis
was downloaded in October 2017. The full list downloaded counts 9,530 records. However,
2,208 records do not refer to specific diseases, but to aggregations of them (e.g. “Rare Pulmonary
Diseases”). For the purposes of the empirical analysis, only specific diseases will be considered,
following the criteria detailed in this section.
Our proxy of R&D efforts targeting rare diseases is the number of ODD granted by the FDA
between 1983 and 2016. An ODD represents the “successful translation of rare disease research
into an orphan drug discovery and development program” (Heemstra et al., 2009). Having an
ODD is a necessary condition for the project, and eventually for the drug, to be eligible for the
incentives provided under the special legislation. In comparison with proxies of R&D used in
previous contributions, such as the number of clinical trials (see, for example, Yin, 2008), ODD
have the advantage of being retrievable from a single administrative source.
We focus on designations in the US as it is the largest pharmaceutical market in the world;
11Orphanet was established in 1997 in France, to expand knowledge on rare diseases and to improve their di-
agnosis, care and treatment. Since 2000 the initiative is a European endeavor. Further information is available at
www.orpha.net.
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moreover, the ODA establishment in 1983 allows us to study the dynamics in the number of des-
ignations over a long time span, including 1993, when Japan reviewed its orphan provisions, and
2000, when an orphan legislation was introduced in Europe. Since the pharmaceutical industry
is a global one, it is convenient for the inventor to apply for the orphan drug status in several
countries to benefit from additional incentives, meaning that FDA data provide a reliable picture
of the global R&D activity. For each drug, the FDA provides the date of orphan designation,
marketing approval (if any), the designated indication, and the company sponsoring the request.
A major effort was undertaken to match the indications of the FDA list of ODD with the
Orphanet list of diseases. Out of 3,996 ODD granted by the FDA between 1983 to 2016, we
exclude 408 records referring to products for surgery, prevention, transplant, diagnostics and
imaging procedures, while 199 records are dropped because information on the treated disease
cannot be retrieved from Orphanet. Moreover, in some cases, we were not able to match the
designated indication to a single disease, but rather to an aggregation of diseases (“group of
phenomes”).12 In this case, in order to be consistent in the definition of the market, we rely on
the hierarchical classification of orphan diseases provided by Orphanet to link the aggregation
with all relevant diseases belonging to it and match the FDA designation at the disease level. If
more than one disease is included in the group, one orphan drug designation is attributed to each
disease, i.e. a non-fractional count is adopted. In the robustness checks, we show results for the
case of fractional counting.
Orphanet also provides information on the class of prevalence of each disease at the coun-
try level, as well as worldwide.13 As a measure of market size, we refer to worldwide preva-
lence. When this information is missing, we consider prevalence in Europe or, if missing, in
the US. Diseases belonging to the following prevalence classes are included in the analysis:
“<1/1,000,000”, “1-9/1,000,000”, “1-9/100,000”, and “1-5/10,000”.14 From Orphanet we also
retrieve additional information at the disease level, including the therapeutic class(es) of each
disease, information on the age of onset and age at death (however, the latter is available only
for 28% of diseases). Ages are reported as antenatal, neonatal, infancy, childhood, adolescence,
adulthood and elderly. We exclude from the analysis those diseases emerging in the antenatal
12For example, some drugs were designated for the treatment of the hypereosinophilic syndrome, which is clas-
sified as a “group of phenomes” in Orphanet and comprises different diseases included in the Orphanet list (i.e.,
idiopathic hypereosinophilic syndrome, primary hypereosinophilic syndrome, and secondary hypereosinophilic syn-
drome).
13In few cases (6.7% of diseases), a numeric value for prevalence is also provided. However, the availability of
this information is unevenly distributed among classes of prevalence. Given these limitations, the point estimate of
prevalence is not used in the empirical analysis.
14Information on prevalence refers to year 2017 and we are unable to track moves from one class to the other.
However, these are very unlikely to occur, given the width of the classes considered.
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period or causing death before birth (323 diseases). We also removed 568 diseases referring to
surgical procedures, and 192 items representing an old nomenclature (these were moved to an
updated item).
Finally, we complement information provided by Orphanet with an ad hoc search into PubMed,15
in order to gather information on the stock of knowledge for each disease. An automated search
was conducted on PubMed for each disease in our list, retrieving the number of articles published
over the period 1970-2016 and containing the name of the disease in the title, abstract or content.
We use this information to construct a measure for the stock of publications (SP ), following the
perpetual inventory method:
SPjt = Pjt + (1− ρ)SPj,t−1
where Pjt is the number of publications related to disease j at time t and ρ = 0.1 is the rate of
obsolescence of knowledge typically applied in the empirical literature (Keller, 2002).
The information on publications is used both as a control variable to proxy the level of scien-
tific information available about the disease, as well as to select those diseases that had already
been discovered at a given point in time (Heemstra et al., 2009). New pathologies are constantly
added to the list of orphan diseases, so that the list of known diseases in October 2017 (the basis
of our analysis) might also include pathologies which were not known at an earlier time. Of
course, a lack of ODD for a disease that has not been discovered yet, cannot be interpreted as a
lack of R&D effort targeting that disease. To account for this, we include in our baseline analysis
disease j only if its stock of publications in t− 5 is positive (i.e., SPj,t−5 > 0).
All in all, our data comprise 136,036 observations (5,132 diseases over – at most – 34 years).
The distribution of diseases included in the analysis among prevalence classes is reported in
Table 3. Information on the prevalence is missing (or not yet documented) in Orphanet for a large
share of the diseases: these are considered as a separate class. Among the classes with known
prevalence, the large majority of diseases is classified with a prevalence lower than 1 in 1 million
(36.89%), with the “least rare” diseases (N4) only accounting for 2.98% of the total. Table 3 also
shows how the average number of ODD per year changes from one class of prevalence to another.
The reported numbers of ODD are calculated taking the average over years in the study period
and over diseases in each class of prevalence. These descriptive statistics are coherent with our
theoretical results and in line with the literature suggesting a positive correlation between market
size and R&D effort (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dubois et al., 2015).
15Pubmed is a web-search service maintained by the US National Libraty of Medicine. It comprises more than
28 million citations for biomedical literature from MEDLINE, life science journals, and online books. For more
information, please visit https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/.
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Prevalence number of % total avg. number of
diseases ODD per disease (yearly)
N1: <1/1,000,000 1,893 36.89 0.03
N2: 1-9/1,000,000 208 3.99 0.13
N3: 1-9/100,000 302 5.88 0.17
N4: 1-5/10,000 153 2.98 0.22
N0: Missing prev. 2,579 50.25 0.13
Total 5,132 100 –
Table 3: Distribution of the diseases among prevalence classes
6 Empirical methods
The pharmaceutical market is characterized by the presence of multinational firms that serve
several markets. Hence, the number of designations per disease granted in the US may be con-
sidered a reliable proxy for the global R&D effort. Over the whole period considered in the
analysis, incentives were available in at least one geographic area. The incentives provided by
the reforms of Japan and Europe added to those provided by the ODA in the US. The theo-
retical results presented in Section 4 show that the impact of both market exclusivity and tax
credits on the probability of having investment is positive and, under reasonable assumptions,
it is greater for less rare diseases (Proposition 2). This implies a different exposure to treat-
ment (incentives). We exploit these differences in time and across classes of prevalence using a
difference-in-differences approach.
In the empirical analysis we cannot distinguish between the impact of output-related versus
input-related incentives, as both of these were part of the US and Japan regulations since their
introduction. However, the European regulation provides uniquely output-related incentives,
whereas tax-related provisions are delegated to single countries. The fact that only two European
countries provide tax incentives (see Section 2) allows us to interpret the effect observed after
2000 as the result of a wider applicability of market exclusivity. Combined with the large size
of the European market, this might have increased inequality between more and less rare orphan
diseases (see Proposition 1).
The empirical counterpart of our theoretical model is a Zero Inflated Negative Binomial
(ZINB) model: the inflated and the count part are respectively related to the probability of hav-
ing no R&D for a certain disease (IIj = 0) and to the expected number of ODD conditional on
IIj = 1. The unconditional expected number of ODD results from the combination of the two
parts, which are jointly estimated via maximum likelihood.
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The ZINB model allows us to understand the determinants of the two different processes
determining a zero outcome (Lambert, 1992): choice (the decision not to invest in R&D) and
nature (the lack of innovative output, conditional on the level of effort) (Winkelmann, 2008).
R&D effort, proxied by the number of ODD targeting disease j in year t, is therefore modeled
as:
yjt =


0, if IIj = 0
y∗jt, if IIj =1
(19)
where:
• IIj is the binary variable introduced in Section 4.2.16 If IIj = 0, the outcome is a “certain
zero”, also referred to as “strategic” or “structural” zero (Staub and Winkelmann, 2013).
For the sake of consistency with the analysis of Section 4.2, we depart from the standard
assumption that the relevant probability distribution for the inflated part is either Logistic
or Normal (hence, the estimated model is either Logit or Probit) and adjust the model to
let the distribution be Gumbel;17
• y∗jt is a count variable, representing the number of ODD targeting disease j in period t.
From the analysis of Section 4.2, under the assumptions of our model, its distribution can
be approximated by a Poisson, with parameter λj = N˜ f (δˆj)) · pdj (I∗j ). However, given
that λj is disease specific, when several diseases are considered, it is natural to refer to the
Negative Binomial distribution, to account for over-dispersion. When y∗ = 0, zeros in the
outcome are due to nature.
As a result, the density for yjt is:
f(yjt) =


Pr(IIj = 0) + [1− Pr(I
I
j = 0)] Pr(y
∗
jt = 0) if yjt = 0
[1− Pr(IIj = 0)] Pr(y
∗
jt > 0) if yjt ≥ 1.
(20)
The probability to be in the “certain zero” case (IIj = 0) is estimated using the Gumbel
distribution:
Pr(IIj = 0) = exp(− exp(−x
′
jtβ1)).
16We do not make explicit reference to time here, as there might be lags between R&D investments and ODD.
However, this does not affect our empirical strategy.
17The Stata code used for the estimation is available from the authors upon request.
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Conditional on IIj = 1, the expected number of ODD is:
λjt = exp(x
′
jtβ2) (21)
The unconditional expected number of ODD is expressed as a combination of the two processes:
E(yjt|xjt) = (1− Pr(I
I
j = 0)) · λjt = (1− exp(− exp(−x
′
jtβ1))) exp(x
′
jtβ2), (22)
where
x′jtβ = α+
4∑
i=0
ζiNij +
4∑
p=1
τpDpt +
4∑
i=0
4∑
p=1
κip(Nij ×Dpt) + θCjt. (23)
Note that we normally use the same set of variables in the Gumbel and in the Negative Binomial
part of the model. Ni represents the class of prevalence, from the rarest (N1: “<1/1,000,000”)
to the least rare (N4: “1-5/10,000”; see Table 3). The binary variables Dp indicate relevant
periods of time, related to the introduction of special legislation in the three geographic areas of
interest, and to the joint application for the US and Europe: 1983-1992; 1993-1999; 2000-2007
and 2008-2016.18 The coefficients κip are the main parameters of interest, both in the Gumbel
and Negative Binomial part of the model, representing the differential effect of each reform for
diseases belonging to the class of prevalence Ni, with respect to those in the lowest class of
prevalence. C is a vector including additional control variables which, according to the analysis
presented in Section 4, may have an impact on R&D effort:
• a dummy variable indicating whether the disease causes premature death (in paediatric
age or adulthood). 9% of diseases included in the analysis (and for which information on
the age at death is available) causes premature death. This variable might affect the per
patient net revenue, mj , as some regulators grant a price premium to drugs targeting life
threatening conditions, and paediatric drugs are granted additional market exclusivity;19
• a proxy for the probability of obtaining marketing authorization, pmj . This variable is con-
structed as the ratio between the sum of marketing authorizations granted in the previous
5 years and the sum of designations received in the previous 5 to 9 years. We define the
variable at the level of the therapeutic area to overcome the problem of zeros at the de-
nominator, due to the large number of diseases with no ODD. We consider a time lag of up
18The first time period (1983-1992) and N1 are taken as reference categories.
19The extra market exclusivity for paediatric drugs lasts 2 years in Europe (Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006), and
6 months in US (Section 505(A) of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997).
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to 4 years as, from FDA data, about 50% of all approvals take place within 4 years from
designation;20
• the stock of publications, SP . This variable is meant to account for the fact that advances
in scientific knowledge in one therapeutic area may increase the probability of obtaining an
ODD. Indeed, the pharmaceutical research is the leading example of a science-based sector
(Pavitt, 1984), because a large part of innovation builds on academic research (Mansfield,
1995). As a result, inputs from science can play a relevant role in stimulating R&D efforts
at the market level.
Therapeutic class dummy variables, along with a dummy variable identifying genetic diseases,
are also included.21
7 Results
In Column (1) of Table 4 we present the results of a simplified model in which we do not account
for the heterogeneity in the effect of the regulations: we omit the interaction terms from Eq. 23.
These are included in our baseline specification, whose results are reported in Column (2). In
Columns (3)-(5) additional control variables are included in the analysis. For each specification
we present the results of the zero inflated (Gumbel) part of the model (probability of a “certain
zero”), and the “count” part (modeling the determinants of innovation output for diseases not
included in the “certain zero” group).
Results in Column (1; Gumbel) show that it is more likely to have no R&D effort (IIj = 0)
for very rare diseases. Similarly, Column (1; count) shows that the expected number of ODD is
higher for the group of least rare diseases, and that the introduction of special regulations over
time is associated with an increase in the number of ODD.
Interactions between the classes of prevalence and the time periods are added both in the
Gumbel and the count parts of the model presented in Column (2), in order to account for any
heterogeneity in the impact of reforms across classes of prevalence. Results from Column (2;
Gumbel) point out that, in the first time period, it is more likely to observe zero R&D investments
20This statistics is obtained by taking into account the designation-approval lag for designations that received
a marketing authorization. We only considered designations obtained before the year 2005, as the designation-
approval lag for more recent ODD would be censored. If also more recent designations are taken into account, we
find that 60% of all approvals take place within 4 years from designation.
21We consider 26 therapeutic class dummy variables corresponding to the classification provided by Orphanet.
These are not mutually exclusive, as a disease may belong to more than one classification. As an example, cranio-
pharyngioma is classified as neurological, endocrine, and neoplastic disease. It is also a genetic disease.
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for diseases belonging to N3 compared to the reference category (N1). In order to analyze what
happens in subsequent time periods, we test the null hypothesis that Ni + Ni × Dt = 0. We
find that these sums are all negative and statistically significant, pointing out that in all periods
but the first the probability of a “certain zero” is lower for diseases belonging to classes other
than N1. As for the dynamics over time, the coefficients associated to the interaction terms are
all negative and statistically significant: the reduction in the probability of observing a “certain
zero” is greater for less rare diseases. As, in the context of nonlinear models, statistical tests
about partial effects and interaction terms are not necessarily informative (Greene, 2010), Figure
1 shows the dynamics in the predicted values from Column (2) to better understand the role of the
interactions. Figure 1(a) plots the predicted probability of having a “certain zero” as a function
of time for the classes of prevalence N1 and N4.22 From the second to the third period, when
market exclusivity is introduced also in Europe, the larger variation in probability is detected for
the largest class of prevalence: for N4 the variation is of −39 percentage points as compared to
less than −10 for the other classes.23
In the count part of the model (Column 2; count), the negative sign of the interaction terms
suggests that, for diseases not in the “certain zero" group, the extension of incentives favor more
diseases belonging to the lowest class of prevalence (N1): conditional on having any R&D
investment, the extension of incentives reduces the gap, in terms of ODD, between more and
less rare diseases. Recall that this outcome is related to the optimal level of investment in the
theoretical model (I∗) and that the results for the comparative statics of γ and z are ambiguous.
The reduction in the gap highlighted by Column (2; count) is visible in Figure 1(b), plotting the
dynamics in the linear combination xjtβˆ2 over time for N1 and N4. In Figure 1(c) we plot the
exponential value of the linear combination presented in 1(b), as in Eq. 21.
Graph (d) of Figure 1 shows the combined effect of the Gumbel and the count parts, i.e. the
predicted number of ODD per year per disease. Even when orphan regulation was in force only
in the US (1983-1999), the predicted number of ODD was lower for diseases belonging to N1
compared to less rare diseases.24 Over time, there has been an increase in the number of ODD
for all classes of prevalence, but this has been greater for the less rare diseases. This means
that the magnitude of the heterogeneous impact on the probability of undertaking any investment
22The plot including all classes of prevalence (Figure 3) is reported in Appendix A and shows that the classes of
prevalence N2 and N3 behave very similarly to N4.
23Note that the lower threshold for the definition of an orphan disease in Japan (about 4 in 10 thousand) means
that some of the diseases belonging toN4 do not benefit from incentives in this country. Hence, starting from period
D2, the estimated coefficients of N4 and its interactions may represent a lower bound.
24A test on the predicted number of designations for diseases having a prevalence of “<1/1,000,000” (N1) and
for those having a prevalence of “1-9 /1,000,000” (N2) rejects the null hypothesis of no difference (p-value=0.041).
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Figure 1: Predicted values for class of prevalence N1 (continuous line) and N4 (dashed line): (a)
Predicted probability that Ij = 0; (b) linear combination xjtβˆ2; (c) predicted number of ODD,
conditional on Ij > 0; (d) predicted number of ODD
(Gumbel part) outweighs the effects on research intensity (count part), which goes in the opposite
direction. The difference between the predicted number of ODD for a disease belonging to the
lowest class of prevalence and one in the highest class is 5.6 times larger in the last period than
in the first one.
In Column (3) of Table 4 we take into account the characteristics of the disease in terms of
life expectancy, and include a dummy variable that identifies diseases causing premature death
(EarlyD). This variable is not significant either in the Gumbel or in the count part of the model,
but its joint effect in the two equations is statistically different from zero (p-value= 0.033).
In Column (4) we include the stock of publications at time t− 5 (in log) to proxy the level of
scientific knowledge related to disease j: inputs from science play a relevant role in stimulating
R&D efforts at the market level. Indeed, results highlight that a larger stock of publications
increases the number of ODD in the count part (it also reduces the probability of having a “certain
zero”, although not significantly).
Finally, in Column (5), we control for the average probability of receiving a marketing autho-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count
N2 -1.264∗∗ 0.279 2.022 1.587∗∗∗ 1.931∗ 1.535∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗ -1.718∗ -0.338
(0.505) (0.265) (1.271) (0.584) (0.997) (0.548) (0.917) (0.554) (0.908) (0.397)
N3 -1.330∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗ 1.392∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 1.374∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 1.363∗ 1.444∗∗∗ -0.918 0.194
(0.431) (0.185) (0.644) (0.387) (0.636) (0.362) (0.723) (0.393) (0.643) (0.325)
N4 -3.025∗∗ 0.369∗∗ 1.318 1.792∗∗∗ 1.200 1.758∗∗∗ 1.317 1.749∗∗ -1.010∗ 0.507
(1.389) (0.186) (1.685) (0.669) (1.805) (0.666) (1.950) (0.782) (0.612) (0.333)
N0 -0.112 0.114 2.496∗∗∗ 1.428∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗ 2.392∗∗∗ 1.580∗∗∗ -1.116∗∗∗ -0.296
(0.231) (0.129) (0.478) (0.476) (0.538) (0.447) (0.555) (0.385) (0.404) (0.264)
D2 0.053 0.473∗∗∗ 3.172∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗ 3.018∗∗∗ 2.046∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.111) (0.657) (0.449) (0.680) (0.469) (0.689) (0.402)
D3 0.101 1.038∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 2.140∗∗∗ 2.629∗∗∗ 2.105∗∗∗ 2.520∗∗∗ 2.120∗∗∗ -0.453 0.111
(0.289) (0.149) (0.907) (0.322) (0.759) (0.344) (0.648) (0.356) (0.506) (0.310)
D4 0.265 1.947∗∗∗ 2.485∗∗∗ 3.112∗∗∗ 2.426∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗∗ 2.341∗∗∗ 3.119∗∗∗ -0.623 1.130∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.152) (0.809) (0.300) (0.692) (0.321) (0.617) (0.345) (0.450) (0.292)
N2×D2 -3.415∗∗∗ -1.732∗∗∗ -3.335∗∗∗ -1.695∗∗∗ -3.191∗∗∗ -1.738∗∗∗
(1.043) (0.525) (0.966) (0.566) (0.963) (0.546)
N2×D3 -3.139∗∗ -1.325∗∗ -3.010∗∗∗ -1.269∗∗ -2.846∗∗∗ -1.321∗∗ 0.399 0.418
(1.303) (0.575) (1.049) (0.563) (0.955) (0.560) (0.822) (0.402)
N2×D4 -3.568∗∗∗ -1.347∗∗ -3.442∗∗∗ -1.307∗∗ -3.274∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗ 0.126 0.390
(1.329) (0.584) (1.088) (0.586) (0.993) (0.591) (0.733) (0.335)
N3×D2 -2.549∗∗∗ -1.286∗∗∗ -2.478∗∗∗ -1.253∗∗∗ -2.324∗∗∗ -1.251∗∗∗
(0.733) (0.407) (0.724) (0.461) (0.751) (0.421)
N3×D3 -2.626∗∗∗ -1.011∗∗∗ -2.552∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗ -2.412∗∗∗ -1.055∗∗∗ -0.158 0.148
(0.698) (0.335) (0.639) (0.347) (0.656) (0.372) (0.695) (0.282)
N3×D4 -2.855∗∗∗ -1.114∗∗∗ -2.800∗∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗ -2.718∗∗∗ -1.266∗∗∗ -0.512 -0.069
(0.781) (0.354) (0.722) (0.361) (0.712) (0.396) (0.656) (0.266)
N4×D2 -2.416 -1.239∗ -2.291 -1.193∗ -2.326 -1.275∗
(1.624) (0.708) (1.784) (0.714) (1.870) (0.748)
N4×D3 -4.327∗∗∗ -1.438∗∗ -4.183∗∗ -1.372∗∗ -4.187∗∗ -1.535∗ -1.896∗ -0.294
(1.636) (0.688) (1.774) (0.686) (1.917) (0.793) (1.123) (0.332)
N4×D4 -4.561∗∗∗ -1.607∗∗ -4.475∗∗ -1.565∗∗ -4.495∗∗ -1.803∗∗ -2.281∗∗ -0.575
(1.612) (0.718) (1.747) (0.706) (1.881) (0.815) (0.989) (0.351)
N0×D2 -3.660∗∗∗ -1.870∗∗∗ -3.631∗∗∗ -1.869∗∗∗ -3.524∗∗∗ -1.918∗∗∗
(0.631) (0.640) (0.732) (0.624) (0.691) (0.460)
N0×D3 -3.043∗∗∗ -1.308∗∗∗ -2.992∗∗∗ -1.291∗∗∗ -2.883∗∗∗ -1.378∗∗∗ 0.659 0.531∗
(0.578) (0.396) (0.548) (0.395) (0.562) (0.364) (0.466) (0.289)
N0×D4 -2.481∗∗∗ -1.392∗∗∗ -2.447∗∗∗ -1.385∗∗∗ -2.386∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 0.344
(0.501) (0.404) (0.531) (0.391) (0.557) (0.364) (0.381) (0.278)
EarlyD -0.258 0.218 -0.187 0.230 -0.123 0.310∗∗
(0.363) (0.153) (0.350) (0.147) (0.318) (0.143)
ln(SPj,t−5) -0.033 0.077∗∗∗ -0.045 0.076∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.018) (0.038) (0.025)
pmj -0.267 0.079
(0.489) (0.269)
Constant 1.047 -3.590∗∗∗ -1.351 -4.729∗∗∗ -1.285∗ -4.745∗∗∗ -0.996∗ -4.960∗∗∗ 2.098∗∗∗ -3.050∗∗∗
(0.641) (0.288) (0.889) (0.299) (0.720) (0.301) (0.602) (0.329) (0.569) (0.328)
ln(α) 1.014∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.250) (0.202) (0.160) (0.264)
N 136036 136036 136036 136036 105359
AIC 56111.23 56006.45 55958.26 55702.65 48933.29
BIC 56808.49 56939.41 56910.86 56674.90 49803.72
Robust (clustered across pathologies) standard errors in parentheses.
Therapeutic class and genetic dummy variables included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Results of model estimation
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rization for drugs belonging to each therapeutic class. This, however, causes a sample reduction,
since the probability of success cannot be computed for years 1983-1990. Given the large re-
duction in the number of observations for the first time period (comprising years 1983 to 1992),
we omit this time period from the estimation. In comparing the results with those of the other
columns, it is important to note that in Column (5) the reference time period is changed to 1993-
1999. The coefficient for the probability of success (negative in the Gumbel part of the model
and positive in the count part, as expected) is not statistically significant.
Importantly, results about the heterogeneous effect of Orphan Regulations across classes of
prevalence reported in Column (3)-(5) confirm results of the baseline specification reported in
Column (2).
Overall, these results show that moving from the period when only the ODA was effective in
the US to periods when additional regulations were enforced, the probability of observing any
R&D investment (zero inflated part of the model) has increased far more for less rare diseases.
Although, conditional on investment taking place, the expected number of ODD (count part of
the model) moves in the opposite direction, the net impact is still largely in favor of less rare
diseases (see Figure 1(d)). This empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical analysis of
the impact of the incentives deployed, which shows a greater exposure to treatment for less rare
diseases in terms of probability that at least one firm invests (Proposition 1). This suggests that
the introduction of the incentives in Japan and Europe may have played a crucial role in widening
the gap between more and less rare orphan diseases. In particular, the European legislation may
have exacerbated this tendency, by relying mainly on output-related incentives, which favor less
rare diseases both through an indirect and a direct mechanism (Proposition 1). This interpretation
is robust to the addition of other variables that, according to the theory, may be responsible for
determining the relative size of the incentives. The next section presents additional robustness
checks.
7.1 Robustness checks
We organize our robustness checks along two dimensions. First, we consider different ways of
measuring the dependent variable (the number of ODD at the disease level; see Table 5). Then,
we modify the sample and introduce additional control variables (Table 6).
25
7.1.1 Counting the number of ODD
In Column (1) of Table 5 we exclude from the count of ODD those designations that are received
after the drug has already received marketing approval for some other indications. In this case,
the innovation can be considered less substantial.25 When excluding these designations from the
count, results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.
In Column (2) we take into account the possibility that, even with an immediate impact of the
reform on the research effort, the increase in the number of ODD may be observed with delay.
We therefore consider the effect of independent variables at time t on the number of ODD in
t + 5. The five-year window has been selected as it is the average time span from the beginning
of clinical trials to the ODD application.26 When the time lag is taken into account, the estimated
effect of the reforms is larger, as can be seen from the comparison of Figure 2(d) and Figure 1(d).
This result is in line with the idea that, not taking into account the lag, the outcome is associated
with a period when the last reform has not produced its effect yet. Therefore, the results that do
not take into account the research designation lag may be a lower bound.
In Column (3) a different approach is adopted for the allocation of ODD originally assigned
to multiple diseases: instead of counting one ODD for each matched disease, we use fractional
counting. Estimated coefficients change and we no longer observe statistical significance for
the interaction terms in the count part of the model. However, results in the Gumbel part are
confirmed, with larger decrease in the probability of observing a “certain zero” for diseases in
the largest class of prevalence (N4). In terms of the dynamics in the expected number of ODD,
estimates of the interaction terms confirm the increasing effort directed towards less rare diseases
(in class of prevalence N2, N3, and N4) as compared to more rare diseases (class N1).
Finally, in Column (4) only ODD assigned to private companies are included in the analysis
(96% of the ODD in our sample), therefore excluding those ODD assigned to universities, hos-
pitals or medical centers, not-profit organizations and patient associations. Our main results are
again unaffected.
25The relevant information was retrieved from the list of orphan-designated products with at least one marketing
approval for a common disease indication provided by the FDA and the Drugs@FDA database.
26The five-year window is estimated by combining our own computation on FDA data and data on drug de-
velopment length provided by DiMasi et al. (2016). According to our computation, the average time lag between
designation and marketing approval for drugs designated before 2005 is 68 months (again, we consider the 2005
limit to avoid data censoring that characterizes more recent years). DiMasi et al. (2016) reports a time period of 126
months from synthesis to approval. By taking the difference between these two numbers, we find that designations
take place on average five years after synthesis of the compound. This result is in line with Hay et al. (2014), who
find that ODD are most often received when a drug is in phase 2, that is roughly five years from synthesis (according
to DiMasi et al., 2016).
26
(1) (2) (3) (4)
excl.appr. yj,t+5 fractional firm only
Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count
N2 1.871∗ 1.544∗∗ 1.945∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 8.573∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗ 2.338∗∗ 1.449∗∗
(1.068) (0.619) (0.924) (0.482) (2.950) (0.650) (1.151) (0.607)
N3 1.318∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 2.061 1.795∗∗∗ 7.705∗∗∗ 2.225∗∗∗ 1.435∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗
(0.643) (0.369) (1.323) (0.500) (2.263) (0.527) (0.598) (0.310)
N4 1.587 1.667∗∗ 2.457∗∗ 2.280∗∗∗ 10.597∗∗∗ 2.802∗∗∗ 1.040 1.656∗∗∗
(1.820) (0.752) (1.174) (0.577) (3.593) (0.523) (1.764) (0.530)
N0 2.672∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗ 2.397∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 4.848∗∗∗ 0.682 2.628∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.401) (0.494) (0.284) (1.674) (0.507) (0.461) (0.294)
D2 3.220∗∗∗ 2.148∗∗∗ 3.482∗∗∗ 2.381∗∗∗ 6.323∗∗∗ 0.330 3.686∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗
(0.687) (0.360) (0.582) (0.309) (1.992) (0.523) (0.593) (0.303)
D3 2.702∗∗∗ 2.161∗∗∗ 3.507∗∗∗ 2.675∗∗∗ 6.014∗∗∗ 0.483 2.997∗∗∗ 2.169∗∗∗
(0.587) (0.340) (0.537) (0.283) (1.967) (0.560) (0.483) (0.262)
D4 2.384∗∗∗ 3.082∗∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗ 3.137∗∗∗ 6.157∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 2.746∗∗∗ 3.133∗∗∗
(0.589) (0.329) (0.498) (0.257) (1.997) (0.508) (0.429) (0.255)
N2×D2 -3.254∗∗∗ -1.738∗∗∗ -3.487∗∗∗ -1.989∗∗∗ -26.443∗∗∗ -0.229 -3.825∗∗∗ -1.590∗∗∗
(1.003) (0.564) (1.137) (0.492) (8.355) (0.594) (0.922) (0.457)
N2×D3 -2.979∗∗∗ -1.304∗∗ -3.746∗∗∗ -1.436∗∗∗ -42.482∗∗ 0.060 -3.510∗∗ -1.175∗
(1.017) (0.610) (0.966) (0.497) (17.204) (0.706) (1.515) (0.643)
N2×D4 -3.427∗∗∗ -1.339∗ -3.258∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -56.202∗∗∗ 0.385 -3.725∗∗∗ -1.148∗∗
(1.146) (0.693) (0.832) (0.447) (15.616) (0.653) (1.080) (0.563)
N3×D2 -2.483∗∗∗ -1.345∗∗∗ -3.698∗∗∗ -1.826∗∗∗ -4.896∗∗ 0.049 -3.144∗∗∗ -1.320∗∗∗
(0.786) (0.391) (0.881) (0.432) (2.204) (0.551) (0.864) (0.365)
N3×D3 -2.499∗∗∗ -1.023∗∗∗ -3.675∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -5.995∗∗∗ 0.364 -2.876∗∗∗ -0.961∗∗∗
(0.593) (0.361) (1.066) (0.486) (2.074) (0.582) (0.616) (0.303)
N3×D4 -2.748∗∗∗ -1.090∗∗∗ -4.011∗∗∗ -1.401∗∗∗ -5.723∗∗∗ 0.564 -3.091∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗∗
(0.653) (0.374) (1.305) (0.531) (2.023) (0.542) (0.582) (0.321)
N4×D2 -2.539 -1.137 -4.332∗∗∗ -2.148∗∗∗ -3.878∗ -0.016 -2.499 -1.091∗∗
(1.772) (0.722) (1.270) (0.617) (2.288) (0.559) (1.738) (0.531)
N4×D3 -4.642∗∗ -1.408∗ -6.202∗∗∗ -2.126∗∗∗ -12.653∗∗∗ 0.460 -4.514∗∗ -1.300∗∗
(1.804) (0.771) (1.322) (0.646) (4.346) (0.603) (1.800) (0.514)
N4×D4 -4.950∗∗∗ -1.513∗ -6.265∗∗∗ -2.020∗∗∗ -12.963∗∗∗ 0.323 -4.800∗∗∗ -1.448∗∗∗
(1.792) (0.791) (1.555) (0.616) (4.390) (0.556) (1.840) (0.538)
N0×D2 -3.838∗∗∗ -2.036∗∗∗ -3.366∗∗∗ -1.596∗∗∗ -6.699∗∗∗ -0.135 -4.105∗∗∗ -1.765∗∗∗
(0.636) (0.428) (0.594) (0.332) (2.139) (0.542) (0.589) (0.339)
N0×D3 -3.225∗∗∗ -1.440∗∗∗ -2.985∗∗∗ -1.242∗∗∗ -6.627∗∗∗ 0.265 -3.191∗∗∗ -1.246∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.380) (0.562) (0.311) (2.153) (0.580) (0.495) (0.297)
N0×D4 -2.588∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -2.067∗∗∗ -1.081∗∗∗ -6.906∗∗∗ 0.034 -2.544∗∗∗ -1.317∗∗∗
(0.511) (0.353) (0.518) (0.288) (2.190) (0.528) (0.451) (0.289)
Constant -1.248∗∗ -4.779∗∗∗ -1.693∗∗∗ -4.573∗∗∗ -25.435∗∗∗ -6.064∗∗∗ -1.402∗∗ -4.667∗∗∗
(0.611) (0.334) (0.524) (0.268) (7.812) (0.507) (0.600) (0.319)
ln(α) 0.922∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ -0.429 1.038∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.160) (0.311) (0.128)
N 136036 111023 136036 136036
AIC 54366.23 50339.77 21282.44 54258.32
BIC 55299.19 51253.43 22185.94 55191.29
Robust (clustered across pathologies) standard errors in parentheses.
Therapeutic class and genetic dummy variables included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Results – Robustness checks on the way the number of ODD is measured
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Figure 2: Predicted number of ODD when considering a five years lag in the regressors (see
Column (2), Table 5).
7.1.2 Sample issues and control variables
In the count part of the model presented in Column (1) of Table 6, we add as additional controls
the interactions between therapeutic class dummies (TCj) and period dummies.27 These inter-
action terms aim at capturing the effect of technological reforms at the therapeutic class level.
In the case that technological breakthroughs, fostering the level of innovative effort in a specific
therapeutic class, take place in the same years as the orphan regulations, the omission of thera-
peutic classes specific trends might bias our results in the presence of correlation with the level
of prevalence. However, results confirm the negative and statistically significant effect of the
interaction terms between class of prevalence and period dummies.
In Column (2) we include a proxy for the net revenue at the industry level.28 In particular, we
consider the ratio between the producer price index of pharmaceutical and medicine manufac-
turing, and the price index for private fixed investment in intellectual property products for firms
27The interaction terms are included only in the count part of the model due to a lower BIC with respect to models
where the interaction terms are included also (or only) in the Gumbel part of the model.
28On the basis of our theoretical model, disease-specific net revenues (mj) should affect incentives to undertake
R&D investments. Unfortunately, we are not aware of reliable proxies for net revenues, as well as price indexes or
dynamics in R&D costs, at the disease-level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
TCj ×Dpj mgt all obs. SP83−5 > 0
Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count Gumbel count
N2 0.834 1.521∗∗ 1.693∗ 1.484∗∗∗ 2.848∗∗∗ 1.439∗∗∗ 2.909∗∗∗ 2.300∗∗∗
(0.656) (0.613) (1.009) (0.559) (0.653) (0.458) (0.567) (0.454)
N3 0.210 1.439∗∗∗ 1.127∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.690∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.775 1.588∗∗∗
(0.567) (0.461) (0.609) (0.353) (0.503) (0.225) (0.579) (0.396)
N4 0.559 1.668∗∗∗ 1.024 1.715∗∗∗ 0.836 1.324∗∗∗ 1.418 1.904∗∗∗
(0.789) (0.616) (1.440) (0.567) (1.569) (0.445) (1.132) (0.544)
N0 0.471 0.668 0.260 1.322∗∗∗ 2.695∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗ 3.715∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗
(0.489) (0.426) (0.635) (0.393) (0.381) (0.245) (1.205) (0.780)
D2 0.722 0.487 3.318∗∗∗ 1.611∗∗∗ 3.824∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗ 2.624∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗
(0.559) (0.434) (0.627) (0.424) (0.366) (0.244) (0.837) (0.643)
D3 0.518 0.675 3.135∗∗∗ 1.413∗∗∗ 3.658∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗∗ 3.417∗∗∗ 2.724∗∗∗
(0.621) (0.468) (0.742) (0.339) (0.329) (0.233) (0.806) (0.475)
D4 0.366 1.475∗∗∗ 3.735∗∗∗ 1.706∗∗∗ 3.054∗∗∗ 2.952∗∗∗ 3.026∗∗∗ 3.481∗∗∗
(0.552) (0.449) (0.680) (0.338) (0.353) (0.231) (0.867) (0.477)
N2×D2 -2.056∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗ -3.127∗∗∗ -1.652∗∗∗ -3.819∗∗∗ -1.502∗∗∗ -3.327∗∗∗ -1.713∗
(0.864) (0.564) (0.959) (0.521) (0.738) (0.450) (1.228) (0.942)
N2×D3 -1.928∗∗ -1.206∗ -2.780∗∗∗ -1.219∗∗ -4.309∗∗∗ -1.408∗∗∗ -3.656∗∗∗ -1.925∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.628) (1.064) (0.559) (0.913) (0.520) (0.910) (0.583)
N2×D4 -2.439∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗ -3.339∗∗∗ -1.244∗∗ -4.021∗∗∗ -1.040∗ -4.183∗∗∗ -1.919∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.620) (1.067) (0.569) (0.857) (0.543) (0.771) (0.621)
N3×D2 -1.238 -1.060∗∗ -2.234∗∗∗ -1.189∗∗∗ -2.992∗∗∗ -0.965∗∗∗ -2.375∗∗∗ -1.342∗∗
(0.764) (0.446) (0.666) (0.393) (0.494) (0.253) (0.895) (0.636)
N3×D3 -1.378∗∗ -1.062∗∗ -2.328∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗ -3.246∗∗∗ -0.864∗∗∗ -3.004∗∗∗ -1.521∗∗∗
(0.700) (0.474) (0.611) (0.332) (0.468) (0.251) (0.839) (0.517)
N3×D4 -1.675∗∗ -1.059∗∗ -2.636∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -3.148∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -2.798∗∗∗ -1.343∗∗
(0.812) (0.494) (0.674) (0.344) (0.483) (0.283) (0.751) (0.551)
N4×D2 -1.112 -0.707 -2.099 -1.160∗ -2.467∗ -0.969∗∗ -1.846 -1.057
(0.842) (0.572) (1.446) (0.602) (1.468) (0.457) (1.134) (0.695)
N4×D3 -3.642∗∗∗ -1.359∗∗ -3.968∗∗∗ -1.354∗∗ -3.590∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -3.617∗∗∗ -1.633∗∗∗
(0.925) (0.620) (1.440) (0.578) (1.343) (0.427) (1.021) (0.589)
N4×D4 -3.846∗∗∗ -1.435∗∗ -4.335∗∗∗ -1.507∗∗ -2.470∗ -0.949∗∗ -3.221∗∗∗ -1.586∗∗∗
(0.831) (0.620) (1.379) (0.599) (1.482) (0.476) (1.030) (0.576)
N0×D2 -1.411∗∗∗ -0.947∗∗ -3.730∗∗∗ -1.782∗∗∗ -3.877∗∗∗ -1.509∗∗∗ -3.381∗∗∗ -1.986∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.419) (0.611) (0.518) (0.427) (0.293) (0.847) (0.653)
N0×D3 -1.006∗ -0.647 -3.372∗∗∗ -1.197∗∗∗ -3.561∗∗∗ -1.171∗∗∗ -4.012∗∗∗ -2.024∗∗∗
(0.587) (0.431) (0.565) (0.345) (0.397) (0.284) (0.853) (0.519)
N0×D4 -0.482 -0.608 -3.598∗∗∗ -1.262∗∗∗ -2.726∗∗∗ -1.053∗∗∗ -3.391∗∗∗ -1.895∗∗∗
(0.517) (0.417) (0.550) (0.345) (0.428) (0.278) (0.959) (0.531)
mgt -1.759∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.180)
mgt ×N0 1.655∗∗∗
(0.333)
Constant 0.748 -3.355∗∗∗ 0.949 -6.367∗∗∗ -1.035∗∗ -4.025∗∗∗ -0.616 -4.299∗∗∗
(0.611) (0.477) (0.890) (0.404) (0.416) (0.207) (0.669) (0.375)
ln(α) 0.780∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗
(0.171) (0.209) (0.163) (0.231)
N 136036 133348 212092 91392
AIC 55485.69 55477.80 71869.02 37279.63
BIC 57214.13 56438.27 72844.17 38174.81
Robust (clustered across pathologies) standard errors in parentheses.
Therapeutic class and genetic dummy variables included in all specifications.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Results – Robustness checks: sample issues and additional control variables
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operating in pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing (as a proxy for R&D expenditures).29
The ratio between the two indexes has grown substantially over the observation period. We also
include an interaction term between N0 (missing prevalence) and the ratio in the Gumbel part
of the model.30 In the count part of the model, the coefficients of D2, D3 and D4 are smaller
compared to our baseline specification, as part of the effect is captured by the increasing trend in
the ratio over time. However, the main result of our analysis is unaffected.
In Column (3) we consider the full set of diseases, removing the selection of the basis of the
stock of publications. In this case, also N2 and N4 become significant in the first period, unlike
in the models that disregard diseases that cannot be related to any publications, especially in the
Gumbel part of the model. This may be due to the fact that most of the diseases that are added
after the first year belong to N1.
Finally, in Column (4), we consider the balanced panel of diseases that were known at the
beginning of our observation period (i.e., with a positive value of SPt−5 in year 1983). By using
a balanced set of observations, we aim at investigating whether our results are driven by the
composition of the sample.
All in all, the robustness checks performed in this section confirm the main results from Table
4.
8 Concluding remarks
Since the early 80s, regulators have started to address the lack of incentives to invest in innovation
for rare diseases by means of specific provisions. As the pharmaceutical market is a global one,
these incentives for the development of orphan drugs have cumulated over time as new countries
have introduced them. There is ample evidence that this has increased investments in projects
targeting rare diseases, meaning a potential reduction in inequality between orphan and common
diseases. In this paper, we study the distribution of R&D efforts within the class of orphan
diseases, with a focus on heterogeneity with respect to prevalence.
We developed a theoretical model to show that the type of incentive that is used may be
29Both indexes have been downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Data. See: https://fred.stlouisfed.org.
Data are no available for the producer price index in 1983, so that one observation for each disease is lost.
30In unreported analyses we have considered the interaction between all classes of prevalence and the industry-
wide margin both in the Gumbel and count part of the model. This is motivated by the fact that, theoretically, an
increase in Mj works as an increase in z, meaning that the size of the impact depends on nj . Only the interaction
term between N0 and the ratio in the Gumbel part of the model is statistically different from zero, so only this
interaction is retained in the estimated model in Column (2). This model has also to be preferred with respect to the
model where all interactions are included according to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
30
crucial to define the relative convenience to invest across different classes of prevalence. In
particular, we consider both output-related incentives, such as market exclusivity, and input-
related incentives, such as tax credits. The model shows that both types of incentive increase
more the probability of observing investment for a less rare disease. This is due to both a direct
and an indirect impact for output-related incentives, whereas for input-related incentives the
impact is only indirect. It is not possible to conclude unambiguously whether the impact of the
incentives on the optimal level of R&D investment increases or decreases with the prevalence of
the disease.
We use the number of orphan designations, a condition to become eligible for incentives, as
a proxy of R&D effort, to investigate the impact of the introduction of incentives in different
geographic areas over time. We find that the number of designations has increased over time
for all orphan diseases, but inequality within orphan diseases has also increased: the difference
between the predicted number of orphan designations for a disease belonging to the highest
and the lowest class of prevalence is 5.6 times larger in the last than in the first period of the
analysis. The gap between less and more rare diseases seems to have widened after 2000, when
the orphan legislation was introduced in the EU. We argue that the large weight of output-related
incentives embodied in this legislation, when compared for example with the US legislation,
combined with the large size of the EU market, may have contributed substantially to this result.
If the reduction of inequality in the distribution of R&D efforts is an objective of European
policy makers, then the weight of input-related incentives should be increased. However, the
adoption of some of these incentives, such as tax credits, may be more challenging than in other
regulatory frameworks, due to the fact that single EU member countries are still responsible for
the definition of fiscal policies. In this context, an extension of the incentive tool set to include
provisions that can be tailored to the prevalence of a disease, should also be considered.
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A Appendix
In Figure 3 we report the equivalent of Figure 1 with a line for each class of prevalence. The
figure is obtained using the estimated coefficients of our baseline model, reported in Column (2)
of Table 4.
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Figure 3: Predicted values for all classes of prevalence: (a) Predicted probability that Ij = 0; (b) linear combination xjtβˆ2; (c)
predicted number of ODD, conditional on Ij > 0; (d) predicted number of ODD
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